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Politicized Collective Identity
A Social Psychological Analysis
Bernd Simon Christian-Albrechts-Universitdt zu Kiel
Bert Klandermans Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
This article develops a social psychological model of
politicized collective identity that revolves around 3
conceptual triads. The 1st triad consists of collective
identity, the struggle between groups for power, and the
wider societal context. It is proposed that people evince
politicized collective identity to the extent that they
engage as self-conscious group members in a power
struggle on behalf of their group knowing that it is the
more inclusive societal context in which this struggle
has to be fought out. Next, 3 antecedent stages leading to
politicized collective identity are distinguished: aware-
ness of shared grievances, adversarial attributions, and
involvement of society at large. This sequence culmi-
nates in the final triad because the intergroup power
struggle is eventually triangulated by involving society
at large or representatives thereof. Consequences of
politicized collective identity are discussed.
When President de Klerk of South Africaannounced in 1990 that the government wasprepared to negotiate with the African Na-
tional Congress about a peaceful transition to a nonra-
cial, democratic society, quite a few White South Afri-
cans were shocked, especially among the Afrikaner pop-
ulation. They felt besieged, and some even threatened
violent action to halt the transition process. Indeed, some
violent attacks took place, but as the transition pro-
ceeded, Afrikaner violence ceased. The opponents of the
transition among the Afrikaners eventually flocked to-
gether to form what became the Freedom Front. They
felt that the interests of the Afrikaners were threatened in
the new South Africa and therefore engaged collectively
in the political struggle at the national level (see
Klandermans, Roefs, & Olivier, 1998; Roefs, Klander-
mans, & Olivier, 1998).
On April 2, 1995, thousands of farmers marched
through the ancient streets of Santiago de Compostela,
the provincial capital of Galicia, Spain's most northern
province. They were protesting on the doorstep of the
provincial government. They demanded that the provin-
cial and national government raise the milk quota given
to Galician farmers and that the government, rather than
the farmers, pay the fines for overproduction of milk. At
about the same time, Dutch farmers were dumping dung
on the doorstep of the Ministry of Agriculture in The
Hague. Later that year, they occupied a provincial mag-
istrate where the so-called manure rights were regis-
tered. Their protests were aimed at the government's
manure regulations that, in effect, forced farmers to
reduce their stocks or to invest in alternative means of
manure processing. In both Spain and the Netherlands,
farmers were fighting provincial and national authorities
because they felt that their interests had not been repre-
sented properly by their governments. In fact, over the
past decades, farmers all over Europe have engaged in
similar collective action.
In 2000, the cities of Amsterdam in the Netherlands
and Frankfurt in Germany were witnessing collective ac-
tion by people opposing the expansion of the Schiphol
airport and the Rhein-Main airport, respectively. The battle
was between the environmental movement and the people
living beside the airport on the one hand and airport and
civic authorities on the other hand. The conflicts oscillated
between escalation and de-escalation, and the people in-
volved were mobilized and demobilized time and again.
One moment airport and civic authorities were confronted
with activists occupying a runway or talking to travelers at
the airport, and the next moment these authorities were
confronted with activists appealing to members of parlia-
ment or the minister of transportation. One moment activist
organizations or their representatives were confronted with
the police attempting to evacuate and arrest them, and the
next moment they sat in consultative meetings with airport
and civic authorities.
These examples are drawn from very different cul-
tural, national, and political contexts, but they all share
three critical themes. First, the protagonists in these
scenarios acted not as single individuals but as members
of social groups. Second, these groups and their mem-
bers were involved in power struggles. Third, the power
struggles were about control in the wider societal con-
text so that besides the immediate antagonists, these
struggles also involved third parties such as societal
authorities or the general public. We suggest that it is
possible to derive from these themes the critical constit-
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uenis of a social psychological conceptualization of po-
liticized Collective identity.'
The remainder of iliis article is divided into four major
sections. In the first seciion. we explore in more detail the
three themes indicated above and thus provide a conceptual
backdrop against which we then suggest a social psycho-
logical definition of politicized collective identity. In the
second section, we turn to the antecedents of politicized
collective identity and try to answer the question. How is
collective identity politicized? In the third section, we show
that politicized collective identity has important and unique
consequences that differentiate this form of collective iden-
tity from other forms. In the linal section, we summarize
our main conclusions and suggest novel and promising




Most, if not all, social behavior takes place in the context
of social groups or structured systems of social groups.
Accordingly, scholars stress the role of people's group
memberships in social behavior (Tajfel & Turner, 1979,
] 986; Turner & Onorato, 1999). In particular, it is sug-
gested that salient group memberships direct people's at-
tention to their collective (or social) as opposed to their
individual (or personal) identities, which then regulate their
social behavior. There is much empirical evidence corrob-
orating the role of collective identity as an important ex-
planatory variable. For example, the concept of collective
identity helps researchers to better understand when and
why people stereotype themselves and others, discriminate
against out-groups in favor of in-groups, and accept influ-
ence from in-group members but reject influence from
out-group members (for reviews, see Brown & Gaertncr.
2001). It has also been shown that collective identity in-
fluences people's justice concerns (Tyler & Smith. 1999)
and their willingness to engage in social protest as well as
other collective activities that aim at social change (De
Weerd & Klandermans. 1999; Klandermans. 2000; Simon
et a!., 1998). Collective idemity thus plays an important
role as an "intervening causal mechanism in situations of
"objective' social change" (Tajfel, 1978, p. 86). In short, it
affects the struggles within society.
Before we elaborate on the concept of collective iden-
tity, a tew comments on our terminology are in order. First,
social psychologists, especially European social psycholo-
gists (cf. Luhtanen & Crocker. 1992, p. 302), have tradi-
tionally used the term social identity to refer to the identity
that people derive from their memberships in social groups
(Tajfel & Turner. 1979, 1986). However, we prefer the
attribute collective to the attribute social in this expression
to preclude the misinterpretation that, by implication, any
other form of identity (e.g.. individual identity) would
necessarily be asocial. As has been shown elsewhere (Si-
mon, 1999), such an implication would be false and was
certainly never intended by the original social identity
theorists (see Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell.
1987. p. 46). Second, especially in the social cognition
literature, the term self is typically preferred to the term
Identity. This is so because the former term seems to better
connoie the plasticity and malleability of the "'working
self" as a context-dependent cognitive representation or
process (Marktts & Kunda, 1986; McAdams. 1997: Sher-
man, Judd, & Park. 1989; Simon. 1997). In the present
analysis, however, we focus on relatively enduring mem-
berships in real-life social groups, which are in turn typi-
cally embedded in structured and rather stable systems of
inlergroup relations. As a consequence, those group mem-
berships tend to provide a fair degree of social-contextual
invariance and thus a rather stable and comprehensive
sense of who one is. To indicate this shift in emphasis, we
use the term idemity instead of self. Finally, we want lo
clarify that collective identity is used in this analysis as a
{social) psychological concept and not as a sociological
concept in a Durkheimian sense (Durkheim. 1895/1976;
Rucht, 1995). That is. collective identity in the present
sense is the identity of a person as a group member and not
the identity of a group as a sui generis entity. It is collective
in the sense that the person shares the source of his or her
identity (i.e.. the relevant group membership), and there-
fore also the ensuing identity, with other people. After
these terminological clarifications, we can now elaborate
on the definition of collective identity.
In the most basic social psychological sense, identity
is a place in the social world. A place is a metaphorical
1 In Ihis article, we focus on large-scale social groups that play a role
at [he societal level. We are convinced, however, thai analogous phenom-
ena can be observed with, and analogous analyses applied lo. smaller
groups within less inclusive social contexts, such as work groups within
a company, faculties within a university, or even subdisciplines within a
psychology department.
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expression and stands for any position on any socially
relevant dimension, such as gender, age. ethnicity, trait,
attitude, and so forth (Simon, 1998b. 1999). In contrast to
individual identity (I or me), collective identity (we or us)
is a place that is shared with a group of other people. It is
thus a more inclusive identity (Turner e! al., 1987). Espe-
cially in modern society, people have access to multiple
shared places in ihe social world. Although they are shared
with oiher people, not all of these multiple places are
necessarily shared with exactly the same group of other
people. As a consequence, there is a potential for multiple,
partly overlapping, or crosscutting and even conflicting
collective identities.
However, not all collective identities of a person are
salient at the same lime. Which specific collective identity
becomes salient while oihers remain dormant depends on
which socially shared place or group membership moves
into the psychological foreground, which is in turn a joint
function of person variables ("readiness") and more imme-
diate social context variables ("fit"; Turner et al,, 1987).
For example, depending on people's unique prior experi-
ences or life histories, they are likely to attach differentially
strong etnoiional or value significance to a particular group
membership (e.g., ethnicity} so that they are differentially
predisposed or ready to define themselves in terms of the
respective collective identity (Simon, 1999). In addition to
such interindividua) variation, there may also be intraindi-
vidual variation over the life span to the extent that people
go through different stages of collective identity develop-
ment (e.g., see Cross, 1995. for a model of Black identity
change). Moreover, group membership or collective iden-
tity salience also depends on the immediate social context
because a particular in-group/out-group categorization is
more meaningful in some social contexts than in others
(Oakes, Haslam, & Turner. 1994). For example, in all
likelihood, a male-female categorization is more meaning-
ful or fits better in a situation in which male and female
students discuss issues of abortion or rape than in a situa-
tion in which they discuss issues of drug abuse. In the
former case, the students should be particularly likely to
define themselves in terms of their collective male or
female identity, and this tendency should further intensify
if their in-group is outnumbered by the out-group so that
the in-group is particularly distinctive in the immediate
social context (Simon, 1998b).
Collective identity, like identity in general, serves
important psychological functions for the person, and sat-
isfaction with one's collective identity critically depends on
the extent to which it successfully fulfills these functions.
Five collective idenlity functions seem particularly impor-
tant. They relate to basic psychological needs, namely,
belongingness, distinctiveness, respect, understanding (or
meaning), and agency (Baumeister & Leary. 1995; Brewer,
1991; Fiske, 2000; Maslow, 1970; E. R. Smith & Mackie,
1995; Tajfel & Turner. 1979. 1986). For instance, collec-
tive identity confirms that one belongs to a particular place
in the social world. At the same time, it also affords
distincliveness from those other social places (or people) to
which one does not belong. It further signals that one is like
other people, though not necessarily like all other people,
so that one can expect respect, at least from these similar
others (which in turn is a necessary precondition for self-
respect or self-esteem). Moreover, collective identity pro-
vides a meaningful perspective on the social world from
which this world can be interpreted and understood. Fi-
nally, collective identity signals that one is not alone but
can count on the social support and solidarity of other
in-group members so that, as a group, one is a much more
efficacious social agent ("Together we are strong!").
Several social psychological processes operate in the
service of these collective identity functions. For instance,
stereotyping and self-stereotyping processes at the cogni-
tive level and conformity processes at the behavioral level
accentuate intragroup similarities and intergroup differ-
ences (Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1987). In addition,
prejudice processes at the affective level and discrimination
processes at the behavioral level induce group members to
see their in-group in a positive light vis-a-vis relevant
out-groups and to secure a privileged position for their
in-group (Brown, 1995). As a consequence, these processes
strengthen group members' sense that they belong to a
distinct, cohesive, and superior social group that provides
them with mutual respect, a meaningful understanding
of the social world, and the collective strength to act
efficaciously.
To summarize, collective identity is a more inclusive
self-deiinition that is focused on a particular group mem-
bership. In combination with several mediating social psy-
chological processes (e.g.. stereotyping, conformity, prej-
udice, and discrimination), it serves important functions
related to basic psychological needs (e.g., belonging-
ness, distinctiveness, respect, understanding, and agency}
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and thus contributes ultimately to a meaningful social
existence.
The Struggle for Power
Groups do not exist in a social vacuum. They are embedded
in intergroup relations or systems of intergroup relations,
which are in turn characterized by differentials or asym-
metries on sociostructural dimensions (Farley, 1982). One
important sociostructural dimension is power, and power
asymmetries are a typical characteristic of many, if not
most, intergroup relations (Ng, 1982; Sachdev & Bourhis,
1985, 1991). From a social psychological perspective,
power is generally viewed as a relational construct that
describes a social relationship in which one party has, or is
perceived to have, the ability to impose its will on another
to achieve desired outcomes (Haslam, 2001, p. 210). Power
can be based not only on the ability to allocate material
rewards or punishments but also on the possession of
immaterial resources such as information, expert knowl-
edge, and status or reputation (French & Raven, 1959). In
short, someone has power to the extent that he or she can
control his or her own and other people's outcomes (Depret
& Fiske, 1993; Fiske, 1993; Jones, 1972; see also Mosco-
vici, 1976; for a comprehensive, multidisciplinary review,
see Ng, 1980). By the same token, the power of a social
group has typically been defined as the degree of control
the group has over its own fate and that of out-groups
(Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985).2
As we indicated above, intergroup power relations,
like all power relations, are rarely symmetrical. Instead,
social groups often differ in the degree of control they have
over their own outcomes, the outcomes of relevant out-
groups, or both. They have differential power. These power
differentials or asymmetries can be more or less explicit
(Ng, 1980) and are often, but not necessarily, linked to
intergroup asymmetries on other important sociostructural
dimensions such as group size or social status (Simon,
Aufderheide, & Kampmeier, 2001). More important for the
present discussion, power asymmetries are a frequent
source of intense intergroup conflict. For instance, the more
powerful group, by virtue of its superior outcome control,
is in a better position to achieve desirable outcomes and to
avoid undesirable ones than is the less powerful group. The
likely result is an outcome distribution that favors the more
powerful group. This should be so even if that group does
not engage in active discrimination against the less pow-
erful group but simply follows its own self-interests. How-
ever, this may in fact be too optimistic because research
indicates that more powerful groups are quite willing to use
the power asymmetry to actively discriminate against less
powerful groups (Ng, 1982; Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985,
1991). In any case, less powerful groups should be dissat-
isfied with the unfavorable outcome distribution and thus
should be motivated to work or even fight for a redistribu-
tion of the specific outcomes and ultimately for a redistri-
bution of intergroup power unless easy individual exit or
legitimizing ideologies undermine their members' collec-
tive identity (Ellemers, 1993; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999;
Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). But the struggle for power is
not limited to intergroup relations with an established
power asymmetry. On the contrary, when the power struc-
ture is unclear or unstable, the struggle for power and the
ensuing conflict may be particularly fierce because each
group is tempted to secure for itself the lion's share or at
least to prevent the other group from getting it. Finally, the
struggle for power may intensify for yet another reason. In
addition to, and on the basis of, its primary instrumental
value related to direct outcome control, power is likely to
acquire a secondary psychological value in that powerful
groups typically enjoy more respect and are (perceived as)
more efficacious social agents than powerless (or less pow-
erful) groups. Consequently, the respect and agency func-
tions of collective identity are likely to additionally spur the
intergroup competition for power.
All this is not to say that the struggle for power
excludes the possibility of intergroup cooperation. On the
contrary, opponents may realize that neither party is strong
enough to defeat the other and conclude that a power
sharing arrangement might therefore be the best solution.
This was, for example, the case in South Africa when in
1990 the African National Congress and the government of
President de Klerk agreed to collaborate on a peaceful
transition to a nonracial, democratic society. It should be
noted, however, that this agreement was already the result
of a power struggle during which the African National
Congress had empowered itself to the point where the
government was no longer able to oppress it.
The Societal Context
We have argued that social groups are often involved in
power struggles in that they try to establish, change, or
defend a power structure. We now need to make explicit an
important, but often neglected, aspect of power struggles
between social groups. That aspect is the societal embed-
dedness of intergroup power struggles and of their imme-
diate protagonists. As a consequence, such power struggles
also have repercussions for the overall power structure of
the more inclusive societal context. By the same token,
they are not merely bipolar conflicts between two opposing
groups, but additional groups or segments of the wider
society are involved as well. This calls for (at least) a
triangulated or tripolar approach to power struggles. Typ-
ically, the following three parties are likely be involved:
two antagonistic parties or groups, one of which may be an
elite or authority, and the general public (or representatives
thereof) as the third party, which each of the two antago-
nistic groups tries to control or otherwise enlist for its own
particularistic interests. These three social entities need not
be conceived of as mutually exclusive. On the contrary,
2 In keeping with our emphasis on the intergroup context, this defi-
nition of group power focuses on intergroup power relations. This is not
to deny the existence of intragroup power relations (i.e., group members'
dependency on other individual in-group members or on the in-group as
a whole) or of potentially important links between intra- and intergroup
power relations. However, though certainly interesting, a more compre-
hensive analysis considering these different types of power relations and
their links is beyond the scope of this article.
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each of the two antagonistic groups (e.g., a particular social
movement and its countermovement) should be anxious to
stress that it is an important part of the more inclusive
general public or population so that its own interests appear
to be compatible with, if not identical to, the "common"
interest. By the same token, each group can be expected to
strive for hegemony, claiming that their own position is or
should be prototypical or normative for that more inclusive
"in-group," whereas the position of the other group is
discredited as beyond the latitude of general acceptance
(Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999).
Until now, this tripolar approach has had little direct
impact on social psychological research. Especially the
laboratory and field work prompted by social identity the-
ory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986) has traditionally focused
on bipolar intergroup relationships (for an exception, see,
e.g., Wagner, Lampen, & Syllwasschy, 1986). However,
two other influential theoretical frameworks are directly
compatible with such a tripolar approach. In fact, they
inspired the analysis presented in this article in important
ways. The first framework is Mugny's (1982) theory of
"the power of minorities." Mugny argued that the social
context in which the diffusion of minority influence takes
place consists of (at least) three social entities. These are
the (numerical) minority, the population that the minority
tries to influence, and a powerful third group that tries to
counteract the minority influence. This latter group may
itself be a numerical minority but one that enjoys an insti-
tutionalized power advantage vis-a-vis the (counternorma-
tive) minority and the population ("the silent majority").
Any attempt by the minority to influence the population
operates against the backdrop of an antagonistic relation-
ship between the minority and the powerful group and a
relationship of domination of the population by the pow-
erful group. It is impossible to review all pertinent empir-
ical evidence here, but this tripolar approach to minority
influence has certainly made an important contribution to
overcoming the reductionism that characterized the tradi-
tional study of social influence processes (see Moscovici,
Mucchi-Faina, & Maass, 1994; Turner, 1991).
The second framework that goes beyond an analysis
of simple bipolar intergroup relations is Turner et al.'s
(1987) self-categorization theory. It is an extension of
social identity theory in that it makes use of, and further
develops, key assumptions of that theory so as to provide a
comprehensive explanation of how individuals are able to
act as a group. Two assumptions are of particular relevance
to the present discussion. One states that self-representation
or identity can be construed at different levels of abstrac-
tion related by means of class inclusion. For example, one's
identity as a resident of the city of Berlin is more abstract
than, and thus includes, one's identity as a resident of a
specific neighborhood in Berlin. At the same time, one's
identity as a German citizen is even more abstract and
includes both the city identity and the neighborhood iden-
tity. The other relevant assumption postulates that groups
are compared and evaluated in terms of the next more
inclusive group or social category that includes both. For
instance, residents of different neighborhoods in Berlin
would thus be compared and evaluated with respect to
attributes that characterize residents of Berlin in general
(e.g., witty). By the same token, residents of Berlin would
be compared with, and evaluated relative to, say residents
of Cologne or Munich with respect to attributes that char-
acterize German citizens in general (e.g., efficient). The
important point is that intergroup relations are embedded in
the context of even more inclusive or shared group mem-
berships, and this is likely to bring into play third parties
such as representatives of the more inclusive in-groups.
In conclusion, both the minority influence and the
self-categorization frameworks recommend an extension of
the conceptual arena to also take into account the role of
third parties. With respect to power struggles between
social groups, we can then derive from both frameworks
that the general public, its institutions, or its representatives
are likely to be involved as a third party. In short, these
struggles are struggles between social groups for power
within society, which brings us to the political dimension
of group behavior or, for that matter, of collective identity
(Reicher, 1995).
Politicized Collective Identity
Politics is typically defined as the constrained use of power
by people over other people (Goodin & Klingemann, 1996,
p. 7; see also M. Weber, 1919). The struggle between social
groups for power within society can therefore be under-
stood as political group activity. Accordingly, we suggest
that politicized collective identity can be understood as a
form of collective identity that underlies group members'
explicit motivations to engage in such a power struggle. At
this point, it may be helpful to distinguish between political
repercussions of collective identity and politicized collec-
tive identity proper. In many cases, behavior or action in
terms of collective identity might have political repercus-
sions in that it also affects the power structure within
society. However, these political repercussions may or may
not be intended by the collective actors. Take, for example,
a religious group that "simply" wants its children to be
taught in its own schools. It is not difficult to imagine that
this acting out of a specific collective identity may have
wider political repercussions in that it may challenge the
educational system of society at large and, more generally,
the power relations between church and state, although
such challenges were not intended by the religious group in
the first place.
In the case of a politicized collective identity, how-
ever, group members should intentionally engage, as a
mindful and self-conscious collective (or as representatives
thereof), in such a power struggle knowing that it is the
wider, more inclusive societal context in which this strug-
gle takes place and needs to be orchestrated accordingly.
To borrow from Marxian terminology, it is politicized
collective identity that turns the social group from "a group
of itself" ("Klasse an sich") into "a group of and for itself"
("Klasse an und fur sich") in the political arena (see Esser,
1993, p. 116).
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Antecedents of Politicized Collective
Identity
Our central thesis in this article is that the collective iden-
tity of members of a particular group is politicized to the
extent that those group members (self-)consciously engage
in a power struggle on behalf of their group. We argue that
group members need to be mindful of their shared group
membership, their common enemy or opponent, and espe-
cially the wider societal context that is affected by and
affects this power struggle. Awareness of the wider societal
context of the power struggle in turn implies the acknowl-
edgment of the role of third parties such as the general
public or authorities that politicized group members should
try to control, influence, or otherwise enlist for their col-
lective interests.
Politicized collective identity is not an all-or-nothing
or on-off phenomenon. Instead, politicization of collective
identity and the underlying power struggle unfold as a
sequence of politicizing events that gradually transform the
group's relationship to its social environment. Typically,
this process begins with the awareness of shared griev-
ances. Next, an external enemy is blamed for the group's
predicament, and claims for compensation are leveled
against this enemy. Unless appropriate compensation is
granted, the power struggle continues. If in the course of
this struggle the group seeks to win the support of third
parties such as more powerful authorities (e.g., the national
government) or the general public, collective identity fully
politicizes. The attempt to involve these parties in the
power struggle inevitably turns the issue into a matter of
public or general interest. This final step also results in a
transformation of the group's relationship to its social
environment because involving a third party implies rec-
ognition of society or the larger community (e.g., the city,
region, country, or European Union) as a more inclusive
in-group membership.
Awareness of shared grievances, adversarial attribu-
tions to blame opponents, and the involvement of society
by triangulation are, in our view, the three critical ingredi-
ents of the process of politicization of collective identity.
Accordingly, we propose that it is possible to capture and
organize the most important social psychological anteced-
ents of politicized collective identity in a sequence of three
broad consecutive steps or stages proceeding from aware-
ness of shared grievances, through adversarial attributions,
to the involvement of society by triangulation. As depicted
in Figure 1, the conceptual triad of collective identity,
power struggle, and societal context discussed in the pre-
ceding section provides the theoretical platform on which
this sequence unfolds. In the next three subsections, we
examine in more detail each of the three steps and how they
build on each other. Although we concede that this is an
idealized or ideal-typical sequence and that in reality the
three stages and the associated processes may often over-
lap, interact, and feed back on each other, we demonstrate
that the suggested succession and the resulting triangular
model are of high heuristic value for a systematic under-
standing of the antecedents of politicized collective identity.
Figure 1









Awareness of Shared Grievances
Awareness of Shared Grievances
A solid body of social psychological theorizing and re-
search suggests that feeling aggrieved as a group is a
necessary first step for people to engage in a power struggle
on behalf of their group and thus a necessary step toward
politicized collective identity (Klandermans, 1997; La-
londe & Cameron, 1994; H. Smith, Spears, & Oyen, 1994;
Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Walker & Pettigrew, 1984;
Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990). Shared grievances
can take on different forms. Klandermans (1997) identified
illegitimate inequality, suddenly imposed grievances, and
violated principles as important grievances, to which
threatened privileges could be added as a fourth type.
Feelings of illegitimate inequality or injustice typi-
cally result when social comparisons reveal that one's
in-group is worse off than relevant out-groups. In keeping
with self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), rele-
vant out-groups are out-groups that are construed at the
same level of abstraction as the in-group and nested in the
same more inclusive social entity that defines the current
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frame of reference. This shared higher order group mem-
bership (e.g., shared nationality in the case of East and
West Germans) not only ensures the comparability of the
(lower order) in-group and out-group but also implies that,
by virtue of this commonality, both groups are entitled to
equal treatment so that any inequality is likely to be per-
ceived as injustice, at least as long as group members do
not embrace legitimizing myths or ideologies (Gamson,
1992; Major, 1994; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Wenzel,
2000). The concept of suddenly imposed grievances was
proposed by Walsh (1988) in his study of protest in re-
sponse to the accident in the Three Mile Island nuclear
reactor. The discovery of toxic waste in a neighborhood,
the announced establishment of an unwanted industry, or
the closure of a company can also suddenly impose serious
grievances on a group of people (Aarts, 1990; Boender,
1985; Szasz, 1994). Moreover, Kriesi's (1993) work on
new social movements in the Netherlands points to the
violation of principles or values as an important source of
shared grievances. He described how in the Netherlands
cultural transformations resulted in the emergence of a new
middle class with its specific principles and values (e.g.,
nonviolent conflict resolution, egalitarianism, ecological
consciousness) and how these changes have fostered the
emergence of new social movements, such as the peace
movement, the antiapartheid movement, and the environ-
mental movement. It seems reasonable to assume that it
was the violation of these "new" principles that led to
shared grievances in the form of moral indignation and
ultimately to collective protest on the part of many mem-
bers of the new middle class. Although they are defending
very different principles, supporters of the antiabortion
movement may in this sense be similar to the supporters of
the new social movements because both seem to be ag-
grieved by a violation of their specific principles. Finally,
members of a group can feel aggrieved because they feel
their privileges are threatened. The extreme-right Whites in
South Africa may be a case in point.
It is important to reiterate that, for collective identity
to politicize, these grievances must be experienced as
widely shared among in-group members. Collective iden-
tity itself should be a facilitating factor here because it
fosters homogenization and (self-)stereotyping processes
that in turn transform "your" and "my" experiences into
"our" experiences (Simon & Hamilton, 1994; Turner et al.,
1987). Collective identity thus heightens the awareness of
shared grievances. Conversely, shared grievances also re-
inforce collective identity in that special treatment or
events affecting primarily the in-group (e.g., its material
living conditions, values, principles, or privileges), but not
other groups, enhance the social-contextual fit or salience
of "us-them" distinctions (Simon, Pantaleo, & Mummendey,
1995; Turner et al., 1987). The causal relationship between
collective identity and awareness of shared grievances is
therefore bidirectional.
Adversarial Attributions
Awareness of shared grievances or suffering is not enough
to become politicized as a group. As a next step, an external
opponent or enemy, such as a specific out-group, an au-
thority, or "the system," must be blamed for the group's
predicament (Ferree & Miller, 1985; Major, 1994). Internal
attributions of blame (i.e., blaming oneself or the in-group)
generate feelings of shame or guilt that may spur individual
or collective action to redress the adverse situation (Frijda,
Kuipers, & Ter Schure, 1989; Landman, 1993; Weiner,
1995), but they do not politicize. On the contrary, they
usually depoliticize because individual or collective defi-
ciencies are made responsible for one's grievances. Adver-
sarial attributions, however, are a further step on the way to
politicization because group members then hold an external
opponent responsible and become angry at "them" for what
they are doing to "us."
Gupta's (1998) analysis of the predicament of the
African-American community supports the proposed role
of adversarial attributions. He argued that despite wide-
spread grievances among African-Americans, the notion of
a "common enemy" has been diluted in the post-civil rights
era, which in turn undermined collective rebellion. He
noted that even the Million Men March of 1995 contributed
to this dilution because its main message was not the
struggle against the dominant White group as the enemy.
Instead, it focused on African-Americans' personal respon-
sibilities and thus fostered internal attributions.
As with shared grievances, a bidirectional causal re-
lationship can be assumed between collective identity and
adversarial attributions because they tend to reinforce each
other. Collective identity fosters (self-)stereotyping pro-
cesses, and stereotypes provide easy and simple explana-
tions for complex social events (e.g., "Jews are greedy and
responsible for our nation's economic problems"; Tajfel,
1981). Thus, stereotypes lend themselves to group-based
attributions in general and to in-group-serving attributions
in particular, resulting in adversarial attributions from
which "we" emerge as the innocent victims or good guys
and "they" as the perpetrators or bad guys (Hewstone,
1990; Pettigrew, 1979). Conversely, adversarial attribu-
tions to an external enemy or opponent enhance the sa-
lience of "us-them" distinctions and thus the salience of
collective identity.
Involving Society by Triangulation
A group that shares grievances and holds an external en-
emy or opponent responsible is likely to demand corrective
action or compensation from that opponent. If the opponent
complies with such claims, no politicization of collective
identity takes place. However, if the claims are refused and
the aggrieved group does not give in, the interaction be-
comes more confrontational, and politicization continues.
This is not to say that increased confrontation as such is
responsible for a politicized collective identity. Many fierce
intergroup confrontations exist that do not provide the
members of the antagonistic groups with a politicized col-
lective identity (e.g., confrontations between fans of com-
peting soccer teams or confrontations between members of
different street gangs). Instead, we hold that the collective
identity of the members of an aggrieved group who engage
in adversarial attributions finally politicizes to the extent
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that these group members try to transform the confrontation
into a more comprehensive power struggle forcing society
at large to take sides either with their in-group or with their
opponent. This implies that they acknowledge or even
stress their identity as a member of that society because
only by virtue of their membership in this more inclusive
group or community are they entitled to societal support for
their claims (Wenzel, 2000). This insight is nicely captured
in a recent statement made by the then leader of the
parliamentary faction of the German socialist party, Gregor
Gysi, who, shortly before his resignation, admonished his
party that "[we] have to become part of society—if we
want to change it" ("Words of the Week," 2000, p. 2). In a
similar manner, Klandermans et al. (1998; see also Roefs et
al., 1998) observed that, while their ethnic identity as
Afrikaners politicized, supporters of the Freedom Front in
South Africa also maintained a strong national identity. In
more general terms, politicized collective identity is always
also nested identity in that it presupposes identification
with the more inclusive social entity that provides the
context for shared grievances, adversarial attributions, and
the ensuing power struggles for social change (or resistance
to such change).
Two less abstract scenarios shall help to illustrate this
final step to a politicized collective identity. For instance,
university students may become aware of their shared
grievances (e.g., high study load for students but insuffi-
cient tutoring by professors). They make adversarial attri-
butions for their grievances by blaming professors' selfish
preferences for research over teaching. They make claims
demanding that their professors devote more time to tutor-
ing them than to doing research or writing books and
articles. The interaction between students and professors
becomes more confrontational as the latter refuse to com-
ply with their students' claims. The conflict escalates, and
the students engage in an open power struggle with their
professors in which the students finally organize exam
boycotts and public demonstrations. They thus involve
society at large. More specifically, they triangulate the
conflict by forcing third parties such as the ministry of
education, the media, or the general public to take sides.
In another scenario, a conservative group of indige-
nous inhabitants of a particular country may realize that
because of immigration their own values and principles are
increasingly questioned as absolute truths and construe this
loss of cultural hegemony as shared grievances. They make
adversarial attributions by blaming "uncultured aliens" for
their grievances and demand that immigrants assimilate
"our" culture or stay away from "us." Finally, they trian-
gulate the power struggle by collecting signatures from the
general public for a petition against any legislation that
would give immigrants equal rights. They thus involve
society or the general public as a third party and force it to
take sides.
For both scenarios, we would argue that collective
identity is not fully politicized until after the last step that
triangulates the power struggle by involving society at
large, or representatives thereof, as a third party. Moreover,
in this last politicizing step, both groups of protagonists
acknowledge that their specific collective identity (i.e., as
students or conservatives) is part of a more inclusive soci-
etal identity, which simultaneously allows and constrains
the politicization of their more specific collective identity.
Additional Variables and Possible Extensions
It is important to note that we do not wish to maintain that,
beyond the variables discussed so far, no other variable
may play a (facilitating or inhibitory) role in the politiciz-
ing process. On the contrary, we would like to argue that it
is a distinctive strength of our ideal-typical model that it
enables us to incorporate such additional variables to gain
a more systematic understanding of their role in the polit-
icizing process. The role of leaders may be a case in point.
Following Reicher and Hopkins (1996a, 1996b), leaders
can be understood as "entrepreneurs of identity" that facil-
itate the various steps of the politicizing process. To the
extent that they epitomize the collective "we," they are able
to facilitate the propagation of collective frames that help
group members to interpret shared grievances, to identify
an external enemy, and to define the wider societal context
including the third party. This should be so because, by
virtue of the shared group membership, the attitudes and
actions of the leader are rendered normative for ordinary
group members who should feel compelled to follow the
leader's example to verify their collective identity (Haslam,
2001).
Group members' social dominance orientation (Sida-
nius & Pratto, 1999) may be another variable the influence
of which can systematically be examined in light of our
model of politicized collective identity. We have already
indicated that legitimizing myths or ideologies could
obstruct, or at least inhibit, the politicizing process. Spe-
cifically, hierarchy-enhancing myths can undermine the
awareness of shared grievances, foster internal attributions
as opposed to external or adversarial attributions, or dis-
courage group members from transforming the in-group/
out-group confrontation into a more comprehensive power
struggle involving society at large. Research suggests that
people high on social dominance orientation are more
likely to endorse (hierarchy-enhancing) legitimizing myths
than people low on social dominance orientation so that
social dominance orientation could play an inhibitory role
in the politicizing process. However, research also demon-
strates that members of low-status groups are generally
lower on social dominance orientation than members of
high-status groups (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). At the same
time, given their relatively disadvantaged social position,
members of low-status groups typically have more reason
to politicize than members of high-status groups. Taken
together, it follows that social dominance orientation and
legitimizing myths should not be insurmountable obstacles
to a politicized collective identity for those who need it
most. This is not to say that high-status or privileged
groups cannot develop a politicized collective identity.
Extreme-right Whites in South Africa are a case in point.
As for all groups, the first step to politicized collective
identity is awareness of shared grievances, which, for high-
status groups, most likely means awareness that their status
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and the associated privileges are threatened. For high-status
groups, the reappraisal of relative status and associated
beliefs (including legitimizing myths) should therefore be
part and parcel of this politicizing step.
In addition to incorporating other potentially relevant
variables, the present model also lends itself to an analysis
of politicizing processes that transcend national bound-
aries. The model was developed primarily with a focus on
politicized collective identities that are nested in a more
inclusive national identity. In other words, it is the nation
that provides the major societal context and thus the arena
for the triangulated power struggle. Typical examples are
peace activists who confront the federal government and
seek the support of the churches in their struggle against
nuclear arms or environmental activists who struggle
against local airport authorities and try to persuade the
federal government to limit the growth of an airport. Other
struggles, however, although they also involve politicized
collective identities, increasingly transcend national bound-
aries. The Palestinian-Israeli conflict can serve as an in-
structive example. In fact, two levels of that conflict may be
distinguished, but in each case, our model of politicized
collective identity can guide the analysis. First, there is the
intergroup relation between the minority of Arab Israelis
and the Jewish majority within Israel. Here, the collective
identity of the minority politicizes to the extent that Arab
Israelis feel oppressed, blame the Jewish majority for it,
and attempt to achieve equal treatment as Israeli citizens by
involving Israeli society at large (e.g., the general public,
the media, the government). Analogously, the collective
identity of the Jewish majority begins to politicize when its
members feel that their privileges are threatened by the
attempted social change. In any case, the state of Israel is
the critical political arena, and it is this state, albeit not its
Zionist version, in which even the minority claims mem-
bership and in which its politicized collective identity is
nested. The second level of the conflict involves the larger
body of the Palestinian people, and here the power struggle
is situated in the international arena. Nevertheless, analo-
gous steps to politicized collective identity can be identified
in line with the model presented in this article. Grievances
shared by the Palestinian people as a nation are blamed on
Israel as the occupying power or external enemy, and the
power struggle for or against a Palestinian state is triangu-
lated by involving a third nation as an ally or mediator
(e.g., the United States). At the same time, the international
community represented, for example, by the United Na-
tions serves as the most inclusive polity in which all pro-
tagonists claim membership and in which their respective
politicized collective identities (as Palestinians or Israelis)
are nested.
Consequences of Politicized Collective
Identity
Like all forms of identity, politicized collective identity
affects how people perceive the social world and act on and
in it. As a specific form of collective identity, politicized
collective identity obviously entails many of the conse-
quences identified in social psychological analyses of col-
lective identity in general (for reviews, see Brown & Gaert-
ner, 2001; Oakes et al., 1994). Thus, it should foster (self-)
stereotyping processes at the cognitive level, prejudice
processes at the affective level, and conformity and dis-
crimination processes at the behavioral level. As many of
the politicizing steps or processes discussed above feed
back positively on collective identity and strengthen it, the
politicization of collective identity should intensify these
consequences. For example, when out-groups turn into
opponents during the politicization process, group mem-
bers may be more willing to act on their biased perceptions
and evaluations and engage in hostile behavior with the
explicit objective of causing their opponents to incur costs
(Klandermans, 1997, pp. 156-158; Mummendey & Otten,
1998; H. Weber, 1989). By the same token, politicized
collective identity should be particularly well equipped to
fulfill the various collective identity functions (i.e., the
belongingness, distinctiveness, respect, understanding,
and agency functions).3 In many respects, politicized col-
lective identity is therefore intensified collective identity
with quantitatively stronger effects than its nonpoliticized
counterpart.
In addition to such general intensification effects,
however, we propose that there are also more specific
consequences of politicized collective identity. In particu-
lar, our conceptualization of politicized collective identity
suggests two additional categories of consequences. One
category concerns the psychological functions of politi-
cized collective identity. Although, as we noted above,
politicized collective identity may generally be superior to
other forms of collective identity in fulfilling important
psychological functions, more specific predictions can be
derived as well. Thus, we hypothesize that this superiority
is most marked with respect to the understanding and
agency functions. This should be so because the politici-
zation process furthers both reasoning about and acting in
and on the social world. Reasoning about the social world
is most apparent when group members make adversarial
attributions concerning their shared grievances. At that
stage, group members' collective self-understanding is
sharpened in relation to other groups, and meaning is given
to group members' common fate in terms of a shared
explanation or ideology (e.g., "We, females, are victims of
sexist oppression."). In the social movement literature, this
process is often described as consciousness raising
(Johnston & Klandermans, 1995). The growing awareness
of shared grievances and a clearer idea of who or what is
responsible for those grievances reflect a distinct cognitive
elaboration of one's worldview providing group members
with a meaningful perspective on the social world and their
place in it. Further along the politicization process, the
agency function is served particularly well by group mem-
3 This assumption does not imply that politicized collective identity
necessarily is a very prevalent form of collective identity. Politicization is
an effortful process that also entails numerous costs for the individual
group member (e.g., opportunity costs, victimization by discrimination
and oppression) so that, overall, politicized collective identity may often
not be the most attractive option.
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bers" active struggle for social change (or resistance to such
change). Even if ultimately unsuccessful or defeated in the
triangulated power struggle, having forced society or its
representatives to take sides confers recognition as a social
agent on group members (e.g.. "We made a difference—or
at least we tried."). At the same time, their collective
self-understanding is further promoted during the power
struggle as group members can construe a meaningful role
for themselves in the wider societal and historical context,
be it as heroes or martyrs.
So far, the understanding and agency functions are
underresearched functions of collective identity because
social psychological research on intergroup relations has
focused more on the role of the belongingness, distinctive-
ness, and respect functions of collective identity (Brewer &
Pickett, 1999; Ellemers. Kortekaas. & Ouwerkerk, 1999;
Hogg & Abrams. 1993; Simon, 1999; Tyler & Smith,
1999). This asymmetry directly parallels the relative ne-
glect of politicized collective identity by social psycholo-
gists. Both lacunae in the literature thus seem related, and
there is therefore hope that an increased interest in politi-
cized collective identity will also shed more light on the
understanding and agency functions of collective identity.
The second category of more specific consequences
concerns the unique behavioral consequences of politicized
collective identity. These behavioral consequences are
linked to the role of third parties in our conceptualization of
politicized collective identity. We argued that the politici-
zation of collective identity implies that bipolar power
struggles between in-group and out-group are triangulated
by involving society at large, or representatives thereof, as
a third party. Politicized collective identity thus implies a
cognitive restructuring of the social environment that is no
longer defined exclusively in terms of a bipolar in-group/
out-group confrontation. Instead, the social environment is
further differentiated into opponents and (potential) allies,
which also involves strategic reformulation of the conflict
issue such that it also appeals to potential allies (Gerhards
& Rucht, 1992; Snow, Rochford. Worden, & Benford,
1986). Politicized collective identity should therefore mo-
tivate not only collective action that is aimed at opponents
but also attempts to directly or indirectly enlist third parties
as allies. For example, politicized group members should
be likely to engage in collective action directed at the
government or the general public to force them to intervene
or to take sides.
Although not specifically designed to test the validity
of the conceptualization of politicized collective identity
developed in this article, recent research on social move-
ment participation indeed points to the unique explanatory
power of politicized collective identity with respect to
collective action (Simon et al., 1998; Sturmer & Simon,
2001; Sturmer. Simon. Loewy, Duhme, & Jorger, 2001).
This research was conducted in several different social
movement contexts, such as the older people's movement
in Germany; the fat acceptance movement in Germany and
the United States; and the gay movement, again both in the
United States and Germany. In addition to the predictor
variables typically examined in traditional social move-
ment research (i.e., perceived individual and collective
costs and benefits of participation), indicators of collective
identification processes were also included as predictor
variables. More specifically, two levels of collective iden-
tity were considered. One concerned the broader social
categories from which the social movements in question
typically recruit their members (i.e., older people, fat peo-
ple, and gay people), whereas the other targeted the more
politicized social movements themselves or their specific
organizations (i.e., the Gray Panthers, the fat acceptance
movement, and the gay movement). Intention to participate
as well as actual participation in collective action directed
primarily at the general public or the government (e.g.,
public campaigns and demonstrations, sit-ins, and other
forms of civil disobedience) served as the main dependent
variable or criterion. Multiple regression analyses revealed
that identification with the broader recruitment category
made no unique contribution to the prediction of behavioral
intentions or actual participation, whereas identification
with the more politicized social movement organization
had a reliable and unique (positive) effect in all cases (with
one exception discussed below). In addition to correlational
data from cross-sectional designs, data from experimental
and longitudinal designs further corroborated the causal
role in social movement participation of the more politi-
cized form of collective identity (Simon et al., 1998; Stur-
mer & Simon, 2001).
However, this longitudinal research also demonstrated
that collective identity at the level of the broader recruit-
ment category, which was ineffective as a unique predictor
of collective action in prior research, can politicize under
the appropriate conditions to such an extent that it also
reliably predicts collective action (Sturmer & Simon,
2001). More specifically, gay respondents' identification
with gay people in general did not predict (self-reported)
participation in collective action organized by the German
gay and lesbian movement in the following year. Interest-
ingly, more than two years after the identification measure-
ment, the German gay and lesbian movement started an
initiative requesting legislation to allow same-sex mar-
riage. As this initiative encountered fierce opposition from
the conservative political parties in Germany, the move-
ment launched a public campaign in support of same-sex
marriage. Sturmer and Simon (2001) reasoned that this
climate would promote a general politicization of gay iden-
tity and therefore conducted follow-up telephone inter-
views with former respondents and recorded their (self-
reported) participation in collective action organized in
support of the campaign for same-sex marriage. As ex-
pected, identification with gay people measured almost
three years before the telephone interviews now reliably
predicted movement participation.
In addition to action aimed directly at a third party
such as the general public or the government, politicized
collective identity should also motivate strategic action that
appears to target an immediate out-group or antagonist but
that can meaningfully be understood only if its intended
indirect effect on the third party is taken into account.
Many social movement activities provide illustrative ex-
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amples. Although militant civil rights activists have often
selected their segregationist or racist opponents (e.g., all-
White schools or companies) as immediate targets of their
disruptive collective actions, the strategic or ultimate goal
of such actions was obviously to provoke the attention of
and intervention by third parties such as the general public,
the media, or the federal government (McAdam, 1982).
Moreover, in such scenarios, politicized group members
not only plan and strategically implement their own behav-
ior to involve a third party and to force it to take sides, they
may also intentionally provoke and instrumentalize the
reaction of the immediate target for the same purposes.
Thus, striking workers can deliberately provoke an over-
reaction from their employers to induce the government to
intervene or the general public to take sides with the
workers. In a similar manner, protesters can provoke police
brutality to win the support of the general public. In more
extreme cases such as terrorism, activists have even tried to
provoke authorities (e.g., the police or the government) to
engage in oppressive action or legislation, hoping that such
oppression will generate anger and solidarity on the part of
potential allies or the general public.
In conclusion, the important point is that politicized
collective identity is likely to motivate actions aimed both
directly and indirectly at a third party that easily evade our
analysis if we rely exclusively on a nonpoliticized concep-
tualization of collective identity limited to bipolar in-group/
out-group relations. As the above examples illustrate, we
would even be unable to adequately understand many
seemingly simple in-group/out-group interactions because
they often contain a critical strategic component, the mean-
ing of which becomes accessible only if the analytical
context is extended to include third parties. Finally, the
reactions of third parties must remain a conundrum as long
as we do not analyze their antecedents in the context of
politicized collective identity. It is therefore the concept of
politicized collective identity that directs intergroup re-
searchers' attention to a number of unique behavioral phe-
nomena and that provides a refined perspective for a better
understanding of the complexities of intergroup behavior.
Conclusion and Future Directions
The aim of this article was to contribute to a social psy-
chological analysis of politicized collective identity. We
suggested that a stable theoretical platform on which such
an analysis can be erected rests on three critical pillars (see
Figure 1). These are collective identity, the struggle for
power, and the wider societal context of that power strug-
gle. On the basis of that platform, we proposed that people
evince politicized collective identity to the extent that they
engage as self-conscious group members in a power strug-
gle on behalf of their group knowing that it is the wider,
more inclusive societal context in which this struggle has to
be fought out. We further suggested that politicized collec-
tive identity unfolds through a sequence of antecedent
processes or stages. In an attempt to sketch an ideal-typical
sequence, we distinguished and elaborated on three stages
of the politicization process, namely, awareness of shared
grievances; adversarial attributions; and involvement of
society at large, or representatives thereof, as a third party
in addition to the immediate out-group or opponent. The
politicization sequence thus culminates in a triangulation of
the power struggle, and it is this stage in which politicized
collective identity is expected to be in full blossom.
Finally, we pointed out that this triangular model
immediately lends itself to the prediction of important
consequences of politicized collective identity. For exam-
ple, because the politicization process tends to reinforce
collective identity, politicized collective identity often has
qualitatively similar, but more intense, effects than collec-
tive identity in general. Moreover, our model led us to
predict that politicized collective identity should be partic-
ularly well equipped to fulfill certain psychological func-
tions for the group member, namely, to provide him or her
with a meaningful framework to understand his or her
social world as well as with the feeling of being an effica-
cious social agent. Perhaps most interesting, we were also
able to deduce predictions concerning unique behavioral
consequences that most clearly differentiate politicized col-
lective identity from other forms of collective identity.
These predictions revolve around the actions directly or
indirectly (strategically) aimed at the third party that be-
comes involved in the power struggle during the politici-
zation process (as well as around the reactions of that third
party).
In concluding this article, we need to emphasize again
that it is not, nor was it intended to be, a review of the
extant theoretical and empirical work on collective identity
as it relates to political behavior. Such attempts are equally
worthwhile and have appeared elsewhere (e.g., Huddy, in
press; Stryker, Owens, & White, 2000). They are an im-
portant complement to the present article that puts forward
a new theoretical perspective on politicized collective iden-
tity in general and on the process of its politicization in
particular. This perspective is rooted in, and grew out of, an
articulation of our work on the social psychology of self
and identity, intergroup relations, and social movements
(Klandermans, 1997; Simon, 1998a, 1999). It draws explic-
itly and often also implicitly on other scholars' work on
social psychological processes and phenomena that play an
important role as antecedents or constituents of politicized
collective identity (e.g., identity, self-categorization, per-
ceived justice, causal attribution, power). Naturally, we
have not been able to fully discuss the intricacies of these
processes or phenomena, which are all highly interesting
and important social psychological topics in their own
right. Such a heroic deed was fortunately not necessary in
the present context because excellent discussions of those
topics already exist elsewhere (e.g., Hewstone, 1989; Ng,
1980; Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1987; Tyler &
Smith, 1999).
We thus hope that the model of politicized collective
identity presented in this article proves useful in generating
a fruitful scientific debate about the conceptualization, an-
tecedents, and consequences of politicized collective iden-
tity. We are especially confident that it will help to explore
several promising new directions of empirical research. In
particular, we hope that future empirical research will be
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devoted to a careful scrutiny of the hypothesized process of
politicization. its various stages and the suggested se-
quence, the specific psychological functions of politicized
collective identity for the individual group member, and the
unique behavioral consequences of politicized collective
identity with particular emphasis on strategic collective
action in triangulated social contexts.
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